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I. INTRODUCTION 
On February 20, 2013, The Supreme Court of the United States issued its 
holding in the case of Evans v. Michigan.1 In an eight to one decision, the Supreme 
Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the retrial of a criminal defend-
ant after a court-directed acquittal.2 Retrial was barred even in the event that the 
acquittal rested on the trial court’s erroneous understanding of the law.3 In holding 
that erroneous acquittals barred a retrial of criminal defendants, this Supreme Court 
decision overruled the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Korsen.4 In 
Korsen, the Idaho Supreme Court held an acquittal resting on an error of law did 
not bar a retrial.5 Both Evans and Korsen dealt with the issue of double jeopardy 
and the constitutional protections guaranteed to defendants in criminal trials, how-
ever, in each case, the court reached the opposite conclusion. This paper discusses 
the positions of each court, the reasoning expressed, and the issues that each court 
considered.  
After fully discussing the positions found in each case, this paper moves on to 
the question of whether the decision in Evans has retroactive application. Specifi-
                                                          
 1. Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069 (2013). 
 2. Id.; See also Evans v. Michigan, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/evans-v-michigan/ (last visited May 17, 2015). 
 3. Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 1074; See also Evans v. Michigan, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/evans-v-michigan/ (last visited May 17, 2015). 
 4. State v. Korsen, 69 P.3d 126, 138 Idaho 706, (2003), abrogated by Evans v. Michigan, 133 
S. Ct. 1069 (2013). 
 5. Id. at 138. 
488 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 51 
 
cally, whether the decision in Evans provides Idaho prisoners, convicted under now 
overruled Idaho precedent, potential retroactive benefit. The retroactivity of Su-
preme Court decisions is an ever-evolving topic that traces back to a key Supreme 
Court case, Teague v. Lane.6 This paper discusses the various aspects of a retroac-
tivity determination and the different questions that must be asked concerning the 
nature of the Supreme Court’s ruling, the defendant’s position in the review pro-
cess, and the application of established exceptions to the retroactivity analysis 
found in Teague.  
In so doing, this paper presents a discussion of the implications that Evans 
presents for the future of Double Jeopardy Clause defenses in Idaho that criminal 
defendants may raise in the wake of erroneous acquittals or acquittals based on 
misapprehensions of the law after the abrogation of Korsen. Part II of this paper 
discusses the background of the Double Jeopardy Clause. It focuses on the lan-
guage of both the federal and state double jeopardy clauses, the historical purposes 
of the clauses, the specific protections enumerated by the courts and how those 
protections are interpreted by the courts, the specific protections granted to criminal 
defendants in the event of an acquittal, and when the Double Jeopardy Clause may 
be triggered.  
Part III of this paper discusses the cases of State v. Korsen, and Evans v. 
Michigan. First, it discusses the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in the case of 
State v. Korsen,7 focusing on how the Idaho Supreme Court defined acquittal, and 
specifically what constituted an acquittal for the purposes of triggering the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. It further discusses the factual determination necessary for when 
an acquittal actually takes place, and the interplay between an acquittal based on a 
factual determination by the court in relation to the criminal charge, versus a mis-
apprehension of the law.  
Next, this paper discusses the United States Supreme Court case of Evans v. 
Michigan8 looking at the reasoning and policy rationales stated by the Supreme 
Court in reaching its holding, and how the factual determinations of the Court con-
cerning the definition of acquittal differed in their application from Korsen. Finally, 
Part III contains a critique of the decision from Evans. It discusses the dissenting 
opinion found in Evans, and the policy rationales for allowing the Double Jeopardy 
Clause to trigger despite a clearly recognizable judicial error. 
Part IV of this paper discusses the Supreme Court case of Teague v. Lane and 
the possible retroactivity of Supreme Court decisions. First, it provides a broad 
description of the decision in Teague, and how the analysis found therein provides 
the starting point for determining retroactivity. Next, it discusses the application of 
the three-part test developed in Beard v. Banks9, looking at the finality of the con-
viction, the legal landscape at the time of finality and whether the constitution as 
then interpreted compels the new rule, and if the new rule falls within an estab-
lished exception to the doctrine, for determining the retroactivity of Supreme Court 
decisions.10  
                                                          
 6. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 7. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 717. 
 8. Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 1069. 
 9. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004). 
 10. Id. at 411. 
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Part V of this paper applies the established retroactivity analysis to the ruling 
in Evans to determine if the holding announces a new rule. And, whether the abro-
gation of Korsen has retroactive applicability in Idaho and what that may mean for 
criminal defendants, and Part VI of this paper discusses the conclusion drawn from 
the preceding parts. 
II. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE 
One of the foundations of criminal jurisprudence is the concept of double 
jeopardy.11 The United States Constitution states that no person shall be put in 
jeopardy of “life and limb” for the same offence twice.12 The Idaho State Constitu-
tion mirrors the United States Constitution and provides that “[n]o person shall be 
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.”13 
Historically, like much of our modern jurisprudence, the Double Jeopardy 
Clause traces its roots back to English common law.14 While history shows a com-
plicated development of the modern protection we now have, the first American 
colony to adopt protections against double jeopardy was Massachusetts in 1641.15 
Titled the Body of Liberties, the Massachusetts charter stated that "[n]o man shall 
be twise [sic] sentenced by Civil Justice for one and the same Crime, offence, or 
Trespasse."16 Departing from English common law, which had only given protec-
tion for capital offences, the Body of Liberties extended protection to all crimes.17 
This Body of Liberties served as a model that other colonies used to develop their 
own protections against double jeopardy.18 It is also considered an important fore-
runner to the Bill of Rights.19 All thirteen states had established state constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy before the Bill of Rights was added to the feder-
al constitution.20 
At its core, the constitutional protection provided by the Fifth Amendment is 
designed to protect individuals from the comparatively limitless resources of the 
State.21 Without such protection, individuals may live in a state of continuing anxie-
ty for fear that they will be subjected to embarrassment, expense, and continuing 
ordeal due to repeated attempts by the State to obtain a conviction.22 Also, repeated 
attempts to obtain a conviction enhance the possibility that an innocent individual 
                                                          
 11. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 12. Id. 
 13. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13. 
 14. Double Jeopardy Clause, REVOLUTIONARY WAR AND BEYOND, http://www.revolutionary-
war-and-beyond.com/double-jeopardy-clause.html (last visited May 24, 2015); See also David S. Rudstein, 
A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy,14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
193, 205 (2005), available at 
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1209&context=wmborj (“Scholars have ad-
vanced three different theories explaining the introduction of the double jeopardy principle into English 
common law.”). 
 15. Rudstein, supra note 14, at 221–22. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Double Jeopardy Clause, supra note 14; see also Rudstein, supra note 14, at 221–22. 
 18. Double Jeopardy Clause, supra note 14; see also Rudstein, supra note 14, at 222. 
 19. Rudstein, supra note 14, at 222. 
 20. Double Jeopardy Clause, supra note 14. 
 21. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1957). 
 22. Id. 
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may be found guilty.23 Further, the prohibition against trying an individual twice for 
the same offence protects the courts interest in preserving the “finality of judg-
ments.”24 Courts argue that protecting the finality of criminal convictions benefits 
society. 25 It reduces the administrative costs of review and retrials.26 And, it will 
lead to better representation of counsel.27  
Analysis under the Double Jeopardy Clause requires an understanding of 
when a person is considered “put in jeopardy.” Under case law, a person is put in 
jeopardy, and it is said that jeopardy attaches, only at a certain point after a criminal 
proceeding is under way.28 In criminal cases brought before a jury, “jeopardy at-
taches when a jury is sworn.”29 In bench trials, the Supreme Court has held that 
jeopardy attaches when the judge begins to hear evidence.30 Once jeopardy attaches 
to a criminal defendant, the constitutional protections given by the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause are triggered, preventing the person from being “put in jeopardy” by a 
later proceeding seeking to punish the same offense.31 
Generally, courts have interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause to provide 
three basic protections.32 First, defendants who have been acquitted of their crimes 
are protected against a second prosecution for the same offense.33 Second, defend-
ants who have been convicted of their crime are protected against a second prose-
cution for the same offense.34 And third, defendants are protected from being pun-
ished a second time for an offense for which they have already been punished 
once.35 The protections offered to defendants under the Idaho Constitution align 
with the policy reasons the Supreme Court states for the individual protections af-
forded by the United States constitution.36 
Case law has elaborated on when a second proceeding involves the same of-
fense.37 First, double jeopardy protects a defendant from subsequent prosecution for 
lesser-included offenses and from charges of crimes for which the original crime 
                                                          
 23. Id. 
 24. Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 118 (2009). 
 25. See Andrew Chongseh Kim, Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal Judgments Less Final 
Can Further the “Interests of Finality”, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 561 (2013) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2235812 (setting forth the currently stated goals under-
scoring courts attraction to finality in criminal cases and arguing for a reevaluation of the means used to 
achieve those goals in post-conviction criminal review cases). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Julia Zebley, Supreme Court Rules Double Jeopardy Does not Attach in Jury Dead-
locks, JURIST.ORG (May 25, 2012, 9:26 AM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/05/supreme-court-rules-
double-jeopardy-does-not-attach-in-jury-deadlocks.php.  
 29. State v. Sharp, 662 P.2d 1135, 1137,104 Idaho 691, 693 (1983). 
 30. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977). 
 31. See id. 
 32. State v. Corbus, 256 P.3d 776, 778, 151 Idaho 368, 370 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied 
(Aug. 2, 2011). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See State v. Avelar, 979 P.2d 648, 651, 132 Idaho 775, 778 (1999) (“The multiple prosecu-
tion component of double jeopardy ensures that the State does not make repeated attempts to convict an 
individual, thereby exposing him to continued embarrassment, anxiety, and expense, while increasing the 
risk of an erroneous conviction or an impermissibly enhanced sentence.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 37. See State v. Petty, 248 P.2d 218, 73 Idaho 136, (1952). 
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was a lesser-included offense.38 For example, in State v. Bryant, the defendant was 
afforded constitutional double jeopardy protection for a conviction of aggravated 
assault by display and threat with a gun.39 The defendant was originally convicted 
for kidnapping.40 Because the kidnapping charge already included an enhancement 
count based on a display and threat with a gun, the lesser-included offense of ag-
gravated assault by display and threat with a gun was barred on constitutional dou-
ble jeopardy grounds.41 Key to the court’s determination of double jeopardy protec-
tion was the question of whether the charges were sufficiently distinguishable from 
each other and whether each could have been prosecuted separately.42  
Similarly, in State v. Pickens, the defendant was convicted of both rape and 
assault with the intent to commit rape.43 The court explained that assault with the 
intent to commit rape was a lesser-included offense of the defendant’s rape convic-
tion.44 The court held that subsequent conviction of assault with the intent to com-
mit rape, the lesser-included offense of rape, was barred on constitutional double 
jeopardy grounds.45  
Second, courts have drawn distinctions between prosecutions and punish-
ment.46 The constitutional protection against double jeopardy protects against both 
multiple prosecutions, and multiple punishments relating to the same offense.47 
Multiple trials dealing with punishment for both civil and criminal punishment cor-
responding to the same set of circumstances are dealt with in the order in which 
jeopardy is attached.48 Further, civil forfeitures generally are not punishment for 
purposes of the protections afforded by double jeopardy.49 In State v. Ross, the de-
fendant raised a claim of double jeopardy to dispute his conviction and sentencing 
for delivery of a controlled substance and for money laundering.50 The defendant 
argued that that the prior civil forfeiture of property precluded additional criminal 
punishment.51 The court held that Supreme Court precedent dictated that civil for-
feitures do not constitute punishment and do not raise the issue of double jeopardy 
under the Fifth Amendment.52 
                                                          
 38. Id. 
 39. State v. Bryant, 896 P.2d 350, 127 Idaho 24 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 40. Id. at 355, 127 Idaho at 29. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. State v. Pickens, 224 P.3d 1143, 148 Idaho 554 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 44. Id. at 1144, 148 Idaho at 555. 
 45. Id. at 1147, 148 Idaho at 558. 
 46. See State v. Avelar, 979 P.2d 648, 651, 132 Idaho 775, 778 (1999). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at 648–54, 132 Idaho at 775–81 (rejecting double jeopardy challenge to retrial of 
drug prosecution based on payment of civil drug stamp tax penalties prior to retrial, where no double jeop-
ardy challenge was raised in tax proceedings). 
 49. State v. Ross, 924 P.2d 1224, 1225, 129 Idaho 380, 381 (1996). 
 50. Id. at 1224, 129 Idaho at 380. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1225, 129 Idaho at 381 (“With regard to [the defendant’s] Fifth Amendment claim of 
double jeopardy, the United States Supreme Court recently determined that civil forfeitures in general, and 
specifically in cases involving money laundering and drug states, do not constitute ‘punishment’ for the 
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Rules That Civil Fines Don’t 
Bar Later Criminal Prosecution, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 1997), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/national/longterm/supcourt/stories/wp121197.htm. 
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Additionally, the Double Jeopardy Clause sometimes protects criminal de-
fendants after a mistrial.53 Usually, a criminal defendant can be retried after a mis-
trial if, for example, the proceeding ends in a mistrial because of a hung jury, the 
defendant may then be retried.54 The court must set forth a sufficiently compelling 
reason to declare a mistrial, such as procedural error that would cause some ob-
struction of the case.55 The court must consider how to provide a “full and fair ad-
judication” of the case so as to provide finality to the action and the charges against 
the defendant.56 Further, a defendant may not bring a defense of double jeopardy 
after a mistrial is declared on the defendant’s own motion.57 Also, a “retrial follow-
ing the reversal of a conviction on grounds other than the insufficiency of the evi-
dence does not offend double jeopardy principles.”58 
However, acquittals are a different matter. There are many nuances to consti-
tutional double jeopardy protection when it comes to acquittals.59 After a jury con-
viction in a criminal action, if the verdict of guilty is set aside by a trial or appellate 
judge to enter a judgment of acquittal, the prosecution is not barred by constitution-
al double jeopardy protection from appealing for a reinstatement of the original jury 
conviction.60 However, in cases where a judgment of acquittal is granted prior to a 
jury conviction, further action seeking that conviction may be barred.61 The prohi-
bition of re-examination and re-prosecution following a court-decreed acquittal in 
non-jury cases is similarly barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.62  
In a non-jury trial, a judge’s order of acquittal “represents a resolution, correct 
or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.”63 A trial judge 
may not control the classification of his action through creative characterization.64 
Pertinent to a double jeopardy analysis of a judgment of acquittal, is whether the 
basis for the determination of the judgment relied on the sufficiency of the evi-
dence.65 “When a trial court enters a judgment of acquittal based on a determination 
that the evidence is factually insufficient to support a charge, the prohibition 
against double jeopardy bars retrying that charge.”66 The following cases explore 
                                                          
 53. See State v. Stevens, 892 P.2d 889, 893, 126 Idaho 822, 826 (1995). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id.; See also Reprosecution Following Mistrial, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH. LEGAL INFO. 
INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/anncon/html/amdt5afrag3_user.html (last visited May 17, 2015) (“A 
mistrial may be the result of ‘manifest necessity,’ such as where, for example, the jury cannot reach a ver-
dict or circumstances plainly prevent the continuation of the trial. Difficult has been the answer, however, 
when the doctrine of ‘manifest necessity’ has been called upon to justify a second trial following a mistrial 
granted by the trial judge because of some event within the prosecutor’s control or because of prosecutorial 
misconduct or because of error or abuse of discretion by the judge himself. There must ordinarily be a 
balancing of the defendant’s right in having the trial completed against the public interest in fair trials de-
signed to end in just judgments.”). 
 57. John E. Theuman, Former Jeopardy as bar to Retrial of Criminal Defendant after Original 
Court’s sua sponte Declaration of a Mistrial—State Cases, 40 A.L.R.4th 741 (1985). 
 58. State v. Avelar, 979 P.2d 648, 651, 132 Idaho 775, 778 (1999). 
 59. See Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 (2005). 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. State v. Howard, 238 P.3d 722, 728, 150 Idaho 471, 478 (2011). 
 63. Id. at 728–29, 150 Idaho at 478–79. 
 64. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96 (1978); Howard, 238 P.3d at 728, 150 Idaho at 478. 
 65. Howard, 238 P.3d at 728, 150 Idaho at 478. 
 66. Id. 
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the relationship between acquittals and the Double Jeopardy Clause as interpreted 
by the Idaho Supreme Court and then the United States Supreme Court. 
III. KORSEN AND EVANS 
The thrust of the two court decisions and their relationship to the protections 
granted by the Double Jeopardy Clause is the legal concept of acquittal. Both Court 
decisions deal with trial court judgments granting defendants an acquittal. The dis-
parity between the two decisions deals with the definition of the term acquittal. In 
the case of State v. Korsen, the Idaho Supreme Court defined acquittal as a judg-
ment regarding the determination that the evidence was insufficient to prove an 
essential element of the crime charged.67 That definition focused on the elements of 
the criminal charge and whether the decision for judgment and the acquittal were 
linked with the particular elements of the charge.68 If the judgment for acquittal was 
based on the sufficiency of the evidence related to an element that was erroneously 
connected with the criminal charge, then the acquittal would not trigger double 
jeopardy protection.  
However, in Evans v. Michigan, the United States Supreme Court defined ac-
quittal in terms relating to the idea of substantive versus procedural rulings.69 The 
Court related judgments of acquittal, not on the particular elements of the criminal 
charge, but rather made the distinction between whether the ruling was related to 
the sufficiency of the evidence going toward the substantive nature of the case, or 
whether the judgment related to any particular procedural mistakes the trial court 
may have made.70 
A. State v. Korsen 
In 2003, in State v. Korsen, the Idaho Supreme Court held that retrial of a 
criminal charge of trespass was not barred because it was a misapprehension of the 
law that led to the magistrate's ruling to grant the defendant an acquittal and dis-
miss the case.71 The defendant, David Korsen, had entered the Idaho Department of 
Health and Welfare in Boise.72 Mr. Korsen was there because of his child support 
obligations.73 He told the office personnel that he wanted to talk with someone 
about his obligations, and he indicated that he was not going to leave the office 
until he was granted some relief from the current requirements he was subject to.74 
He informed the office workers that he might get loud.75 The office workers told 
Mr. Korsen that they could not help him.76 Rather, only the court could do what he 
was asking.77  
                                                          
 67. State v. Korsen, 69 P.3d 126, 138 Idaho 706, (2003). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069 (2013). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Korsen, 69 P.3d at 138, 138 Idaho at 718. 
 72. Id. at 130, 138 Idaho at 710. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Korsen, 69 P.3d at 130, 138 Idaho at 710. 
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Mr. Korsen was told that if he wanted his required child support payments 
changed, he would need to speak with the court.78 During that discussion, Mr. 
Korsen began to raise his voice.79 While Mr. Korsen did not make any threats, nor 
did he swear at the office works, Mr. Korsen would not leave the offices.80 The 
office workers called the police.81 When the police arrived, Mr. Korsen “was ar-
rested at the scene on a charge of trespass under I.C. § 18–7008(8), because he re-
fused to leave after being asked by the regional director of the department, who was 
in charge of the offices, to vacate the premises.”82 
The case went to trial in magistrate court.83 The magistrate judge dismissed 
the trespass charge for two reasons.84 First, on Constitutional grounds, the magis-
trate held that the statute was void for vagueness “as applied to public property and 
because the statute failed to properly inform a person on public property about the 
specific conduct prohibited by the statute.”85 Second, the magistrate granted Mr. 
Korsen an acquittal “under Idaho Criminal Rule 29.”86 The magistrate concluded 
that “insufficient evidence had been presented to support a verdict of guilty on the 
trespass charge.”87 The magistrate held that “the state failed to prove that Korsen 
did or said anything to justify the director's request that Korsen leave the premis-
es.”88 The State appealed the magistrate’s decision to the district court.89  
On appeal, Mr. Korsen argued that even if the magistrate had erred when the 
case was dismissed, Mr. Korsen was protected from retrial by the protections given 
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.90 The district court upheld the magistrate’s de-
termination that the statute was void for vagueness; however, it also ruled that 
“double jeopardy did not apply because the acquittal by the magistrate was based 
on an erroneous legal ruling.”91 On the State’s appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
Mr. Korsen argued that “even if the Rule 29 dismissal was made in error, double 
jeopardy had attached, barring a retrial on the trespass charge in the event of a re-
mand.”92 After the district court affirmed the magistrate’s void for vagueness de-
termination, at issue before the Idaho Supreme Court was whether the magistrate 
erred “by granting Korsen’s Rule 29 motion for acquittal based upon the State’s 
                                                          
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Korsen, 69 P.3d at 130, 138 Idaho at 710. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.; see also I.C.R. 29(a) (“The court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion shall 
order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information or 
complaint after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of 
such offense or offenses. If a defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence of-
fered by the state is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence. In the event the court dismisses the 
charged offense, the court must consider whether the evidence would be sufficient to sustain a conviction 
on a lesser included offense.”). 
 87. Korsen, 69 P.3d at 130, 138 Idaho at 710. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 136, 138 Idaho at 716. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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failure to prove a legitimate reason for asking Korsen to leave the premises, when 
the statute has no such requirement as one of its elements?”93 
In reviewing the case, the Idaho Supreme Court started with the established 
principle that double jeopardy will bar the retrial of a criminal defendant if the 
court grants an acquittal to the defendant based on an evidentiary determination that 
the evidence submitted was insufficient to support the charge.94 The mere charac-
terization of the action as an acquittal is not sufficient to determine that double 
jeopardy protection was triggered.95 What that meant, was that for Mr. Korsen to be 
protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court would have to determine that 
the magistrate’s judgment of acquittal was based on a ruling that the State failed to 
provide factual evidence sufficient to support that charge.96 The trial court must 
have “actually resolved in favor of the defendant a factual element necessary for a 
criminal conviction” for the acquittal to be deemed appropriate.97 The factual ele-
ment in question must have been an essential element of the offense charged.98 
The Idaho Supreme Court reasoned that it was not the resolution of a factual 
dispute in favor of the defendant that led to the dismissal; therefore, the dismissal 
did not constitute an acquittal necessary to trigger the double jeopardy prohibi-
tion.99 The problem was that the trespass statute in question did not require any 
“adequate reason” as required by the magistrate.100 In reviewing the magistrate’s 
reasoning for requiring this “adequate reason,” the Idaho Supreme Court deter-
mined that the lower court had made a legal conclusion.101  
The Idaho Supreme Court noted that “[t]he determination that the trespass 
statute requires this ‘adequate reason’ element was a legal one.”102 But, “[t]he de-
termination that the reason in this case was not adequate was, at least arguably, 
factual.”103 Where the magistrate went wrong, was that the factual findings and the 
legal conclusion did not actually determine any essential element of the crime of 
trespass.104 And again, the determination of whether double jeopardy bars a retrial 
hinges upon the determination of an essential element of the crime charged.105 
The Idaho Supreme Court explained that “by requiring proof of an adequate 
reason for asking someone to leave public property, the magistrate effectively cre-
ated an additional statutory element to I.C. § 18–7008(8) that the law does not re-
quire.”106 The Court held that because “the magistrate's determination that there 
was inadequate reason for asking Korsen to leave the Health and Welfare offices 
                                                          
 93. Korsen, 69 P.3d at 131, 138 Idaho at 711. 
 94. Id. at 136–37, 138 Idaho at 716–17. 
 95. Id. at 137, 138 Idaho at 717. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Korsen, 69 P.3d at 138, 138 Idaho at 718. 
 100. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7008(8) (West 2013) (“Every person, except under landlord-
tenant relationship, who, being first notified in writing, or verbally by the owner or authorized agent of the 
owner of real property, to immediately depart from the same and who refuses to so depart, or who, without 
permission or invitation, returns and enters said property within a year, after being so notified.”). 
 101. Korsen, 69 P.2d at 137, 138 Idaho at 717. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Korsen, 69 P.2d at 137, 138 Idaho at 717. 
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did not resolve an essential element of trespassing, the dismissal of the case on that 
ground does not constitute an ‘acquittal’ implicating double jeopardy concerns. 
Retrial is therefore not barred.”107  
The Court found that the policy rationales that underlie the principles of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause permitted retrial in this case because the prosecution was 
not being given an opportunity to bring in new evidence that it failed to supply dur-
ing the first trial, rather, the retrial was the result of a legal error in which the pros-
ecution was required to prove and element that was not necessary for a convic-
tion.108 
Seven years later, in State v. Howard, the Idaho Supreme Court once again 
explained the significance of judicial determination based on evidence that is factu-
ally sufficient to support the charge of the crime.109 Citing Korsen as precedent, the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Howard explained that double jeopardy is generally trig-
gered upon acquittal in criminal actions.110 That is true even if the acquittal was 
based on erroneous legal rulings.111 However, in certain cases, such as Korsen, the 
erroneous legal rulings create a situation in which the defendant cannot be consid-
ered to have been “acquitted” so as to trigger double jeopardy.112 The ultimate de-
termination is whether or not the acquittal was based on the sufficiency of the evi-
dence relating to the elements of the crime charged.113 
B. Evans v. Michigan 
In an eight to one decision, the United States Supreme Court held, in Evans v. 
Michigan, that when the trial court rules that a state has failed to produce sufficient 
evidence of guilt and renders an acquittal, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial 
for the offense.114 This holds true even if the trial court misunderstands the ele-
ments of the charged offense. In Evans, the defendant, Lamar Evans, was charged 
with burning other real property, a violation of Michigan statutory law.115 Mr. Ev-
ans was arrested after police heard an explosion and they saw Mr. Evans moving 
away from a burning building carrying a gasoline can.116 Mr. Evans admitted that 
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he was the one who had set the house of fire.117 The house was unoccupied at the 
time.118  
If the building had been a “dwelling house,” Mr. Evans might have been 
charged with burning a dwelling, a crime under a statute punishable by up to twen-
ty years in prison.119 However, because the building was not occupied at the time, 
Mr. Evans was only charged with burning other real property, a crime under a stat-
ute only punishable by up to ten years in prison.120 The crime of burning other real 
property was a lesser-included offence of the crime of burning a dwelling house.121 
After the prosecution had presented their evidence, Mr. Evans moved for a di-
rected verdict.122 Mr. Evans argued that the prosecution had failed to prove all of 
the elements of the charged offense.123 Specifically, Mr. Evans argued that the 
prosecution was required to prove that the building in question was not a dwelling, 
and failing to so prove, Mr. Evans was entitled to a directed verdict.124 Despite the 
prosecution’s denial that the charged offense required any such element to be prov-
en, the trial judge concluded that the prosecution was, in fact, required to establish 
that the building was not a dwelling.125 After the trial judge determined that the 
State had failed to prove that the building was not a dwelling, the judge granted Mr. 
Evans’ petition for a directed verdict.126 The order entered into the record was la-
beled an acquittal.127 
The State appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, and Mr. Evans conced-
ed that his original position concerning the elements of the charged offense was 
wrong.128 The judge had erred by adding and element to the offense that was not 
required by statute.129 The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s 
ruling and remanded for a retrial.130 The court held that trial court’s order did not 
constitute an acquittal and did not trigger double jeopardy protection because there 
was no resolution of a factual element of the criminal offense.131 The Michigan 
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. The Court held that when an acquittal 
is based on the erroneous addition of an essential element to a charged offense, then 
the decision does not constitute a resolution of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of 
the charged offense so as to trigger double jeopardy protection.132 The United States 
Supreme Court granted review.133 
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In its decision, the Supreme Court started its reasoning and analysis looking at 
precedent.134 The Court proclaimed, “It has been half a century since we first rec-
ognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial following a court-decreed ac-
quittal, even if the acquittal is ‘based upon an egregiously erroneous founda-
tion.’”135 The Court was referring to the case of Fong Foo v. United States.136 In 
Fong Foo, the defendants were charged with conspiracy and concealing material 
facts “in a matter within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States.”137 Dur-
ing the trial, the district judged “directed the jury to return verdicts of acquittal as to 
all the defendants.”138 However, the trial court did not have the power to issue such 
a direction.139  
The Supreme Court held that a verdict of acquittal, even acquittals based on 
“egregiously erroneous” foundations, were final.140 Therefore, verdicts of acquittal 
could not be reviewed.141 The Court found that “[t]he petitioners were tried under a 
valid indictment in a federal court which had jurisdiction over them and over the 
subject matter. The trial did not terminate prior to the entry of judgment” but rather 
“[i]t terminated with the entry of a final judgment of acquittal as to each petition-
er.”142 The Court held that while “[t]he Court of Appeals thought, not without rea-
son, that the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation. Never-
theless, the verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed without putting 
the petitioners twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the constitution.”143 
The Court further noted that in Smith v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court 
held that a mistake in the understanding of what evidence would be sufficient for a 
conviction to be sustained, barred retrial after a court-decreed acquittal. 144 The 
Court stated, “[W]e have long held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits reexamination of a court-decreed acquittal to the same extent 
it prohibits reexamination of an acquittal by jury verdict.”145 Going further, the 
Court stated that “any contention that the Double Jeopardy Clause must itself (even 
absent provision by the State) leave open a way of correcting legal errors is at odds 
with the well-established rule that the bar will attach to a pre-verdict acquittal that 
is patently wrong in law.”146  
Similarly, the Court explained that in Sanabria v. United States, the Court 
held that verdicts of acquittal are final,147 even if based on erroneous decisions that 
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exclude pertinent evidence.148 However, if after the court renders a guilty verdict 
the indictment was dismissed, then constitutional double jeopardy protection would 
not stop the verdict from being reinstated.149 And, in Arizona v. Rumsey, the Court 
held that an acquittal based on a “misconstruction of the statute” barred a retrial.150 
The Court reasoned that “an acquittal on the merits by the sole decision maker in 
the proceeding is final and bars retrial on the same charge.”151 The Court held that 
application of double jeopardy principals barred the imposition of the death penalty 
after a sentencing of life imprisonment.152 
In Evans, The Supreme Court recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
bars a retrial of any acquittal decreed by the court.153 It makes no difference if the 
acquittal is based upon a legal error.154 An acquittal cannot be reviewed without 
triggering double jeopardy in violation of the Constitution.155 Supreme Court cases 
have “defined an acquittal to encompass any ruling that the prosecution’s proof is 
insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense.”156 Acquittal would, there-
fore, include rulings by the courts on the insufficiency of evidence to convict.157 
Also, factual findings that necessarily establish a criminal defendant’s lack of cul-
pability, and “any other ruling which relates to the ultimate question of guilt or in-
nocence” would fall under the category of acquittal.158  
The Supreme Court differentiated between two types of rulings.159 The Court 
explained that there are both substantive and procedural rulings.160 Both substantive 
and procedural rulings may end a trial early.161 However, the consequences of each 
type of ruling are different.162 Substantive rulings are different from procedural 
rulings because if a retrial is allowed due to a substantive ruling, the superior re-
sources of the Government may wear down the defendant to a point where the in-
nocent may be found guilty.163  
Procedural dismissals relate to questions of factual guilt that are not related 
but serve other purposes such as a judgment that a defendant may not be punished 
due to an error with the indictment.164 The courts generally refer to procedural ter-
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minations as dismissal or mistrial.165 Procedural rulings may also cause a case to be 
terminated midtrial.166 However, procedural rulings do not pose the same concerns 
as substantive rulings because they do not produce the same expectation of finality 
in a defendant that substantive rulings do.167  
The Court admitted that “[t]here [was] no question the trial court’s ruling was 
wrong; it was predicated upon a clear misunderstanding of what facts the State 
needed to prove under State law.”168 However, the Court explained that all prece-
dent cases instruct that any acquittal based on the insufficiency of evidence pre-
cludes a retrial regardless of whether the trial court’s evaluation of the evidence 
was based on a correct ruling of the law.169 The Court drew a distinction between 
the accuracy of the trial court’s judgment to acquit, and the essential character of an 
acquittal itself.170  
The Supreme Court explained that the trial court had granted the defendant’s 
motion in the context of a finding that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
conviction.171 Further evidence showed that the trial court had made its determina-
tion of the testimony presented by the State.172 And as such, “the trial court's judg-
ment of acquittal resolved the question of Evans' guilt or innocence as a matter of 
the sufficiency of the evidence, not on unrelated procedural grounds. That judg-
ment, ‘however erroneous’ it was, precludes reprosecution on this charge, and so 
should have barred the State's appeal as well.”173 
The Court went on to state that “for cases such as this, in which a trial court 's 
interpretation of the relevant criminal statute is likely to prove dispositive, we see 
no reason why jurisdictions could not provide for mandatory continuances or expe-
dited interlocutory appeals if they wished to prevent misguided acquittals from be-
ing entered.”174 The Court explained that “having chosen to vest its courts with the 
power to grant midtrial acquittals, the State must bear the corresponding risk that 
some acquittals will be granted in error.”175  
Therefore, the trial court’s ruling was not a procedural dismissal that was un-
related to the factual guilt or innocent of the defendant, but rather “a determination 
that the State had failed to prove its case.”176 Therefore, under Supreme Court prec-
edent, such a ruling constituted an acquittal for purposes of double jeopardy and 
triggered the defendant’s constitutional protection.177 
C. The Evans Dissent 
A strong critique of the Evans decision is found in Justice Alito’s dissenting opin-
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ion. Justice Alito provides strong opposition to the majority’s decision, finding 
fault with its reasoning and its interpretation of Court precedent. First, the Court’s 
decision “is not consistent with the original meaning of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.”178 The Fifth Amendment states that no “person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”179 As such, the protections af-
forded by the Double Jeopardy Clause focus on the offense that an individual is 
subject to.180 The offense, or criminal charge, is defined by the specific elements of 
the charge.181 For that reason, the Court has consistently held that an acquittal must 
represent a resolution of “’some or all of the factual elements of the offense 
charged.’”182  
 
However, the Court’s decision, in Evans, rejects the entire notion that the el-
ements of an offense play a part in the definition of an acquittal, rather, the Court 
reached the conclusion that acquittal was defined by a determination of the substan-
tive or procedural nature of the judgment.183 This rejection of an element based 
definition of acquittal for a substantive or procedural based determination of the 
judgment is not in line with the Court’s precedent.184 
Further, the Court’s decision opens up the legal system to exploitation from 
any silver-tongued litigator who is able to convince a trial judge of a misapplication 
of the law. As Justice Alito notes in his dissent, the Supreme Court ordered the 
application of double jeopardy protection because an “attorney managed to con-
vince a judge to terminate petitioner's first trial prior to verdict on the specious 
ground that the offense with which he was charged contains an imaginary ‘element’ 
that the prosecution could not prove.”185 If all acquittals trigger application of dou-
ble jeopardy protection, regardless of any factual or legal errors, so long as the ac-
quittal is based on the substantive aspect of the criminal charge, then defendants 
may start invoking outlandish defenses based on quasi-legal analysis in the hopes 
of enticing an acquittal because once that acquittal is granted, the defendants are 
home free. 
Finally, the Court’s decision in Evans is inconsistent with the purposes of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. The Fifth Amendment is designed to protect individuals 
from the comparatively limitless resources of the State.186 Without such protection, 
individuals may live in a state of continuing anxiety for fear that they will be sub-
jected to embarrassment, expense, and continuing ordeal due to repeated attempts 
by the State to obtain a conviction.187 Also, repeated attempts to obtain a conviction 
enhance the possibility that an innocent individual may be found guilty.188  
However, the Court’s decision here does not follow from those designed pro-
tections, and “[a]llowing retrial in the circumstances of the present case would not 
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result in any such abuse.”189 Allowing a retrial would simply give the prosecution 
an opportunity to persuade the trial judge based on the actual elements of the of-
fense.190 This is not a case where the prosecution is attempting to convict the de-
fendant multiple times in an exercise of limitless resources being used to gain a 
guilty verdict.191 It was, in fact, the defendant who “fooled the judge into commit-
ting an error.”192  
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that States have a recogniza-
ble interest in receiving a chance to convict individuals who violate State laws.193 
However, the Court’s decision in this case takes that chance away from Michigan, 
and sets a precedent for taking that chance away from many States in the future. 
IV. TEAGUE V. LANE: THE RETROACTIVITY OF SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS 
A fundamental component necessary for answering the question of what ef-
fect Evans has on habeas corpus claims in Idaho, is an understanding of when a 
Supreme Court decision may be applied retroactively on collateral appeals. This 
part first presents the Supreme Court case of Teague v. Lane that sets forth a three-
step analysis for determining when Supreme Court decisions are given retroactive 
effect, then takes a closer look at when a Supreme Court decisions is determined to 
have announced a new rule. 
A. Teague v. Lane 
In Teague v. Lane, the United States Supreme Court analyzed and established 
the current rule concerning the retroactivity of Supreme Court decisions in matters 
of new rules concerning constitutional criminal procedure.194 The retroactivity 
analysis prior to the Teague ruling was constantly in flux,195 and the Court had been 
looking for a way to simplify the analysis.196 Further, prior to the Teague ruling, the 
Court often set forth a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure and applied it 
then and there to the current defendant.197 In some instances the Court addressed 
the question of retroactivity in the same case.198 However, in most cases the Court 
would take up any retroactivity discussion concerning that new rule at a later time 
when brought by a new petitioner.199  
However, in Teague, the Court changed its position.200 The Court stated that 
“the question whether a decision announcing a new rule should be given prospec-
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tive or retroactive effect should be faced at the time of that decision.”201 As such, 
the Court noted that “[r]etroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question, for, 
once a new rule is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, even-
handed justice requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly situ-
ated.”202 The Court became fully committed to the idea that questions concerning 
the retroactivity of new rules dealing with constitutional criminal procedure needed 
to be answered first.203 The Court stated that “we should ask whether such a rule 
would be applied retroactively to the case at issue.”204 
The general rule established in Teague is that “new rules of criminal proce-
dure do not apply retroactively to cases which had become final on direct review at 
the time the new rule was decided.”205 The Court stated that “it has long been estab-
lished that a final civil judgment entered under a given rule of law may withstand 
subsequent judicial change in that rule.”206 The Court was trying to protect the fi-
nality of criminal convictions.207 The Court understood that States had a vested 
interest in that finality.208 The Court stated that “[a]pplication of constitutional rules 
not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the 
principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice sys-
tem.”209 The deterrent effect of the criminal justice system is lost if finality is taken 
away.210  
The Court adopted a retroactivity approach based on the “principle that habe-
as corpus cannot be used as a vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal 
procedure,” except under limited circumstances.211 Convictions may become final 
in a number of different ways. For purposes of determining the finality of convic-
tions, “[s]tate convictions are final for purposes of retroactivity analysis when the 
availability of direct appeal to the state courts has been exhausted.”212 Further, for 
conviction to be final, “the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari” must 
have elapsed.213 Additionally, a conviction is final if a filed petition for a writ of 
certiorari has been denied.214 
In Teague, the Supreme Court drew the distinction between cases that were 
still on direct appeal when a new rule was established, and those cases that were on 
collateral review at the time of the new rule.215 In criminal jurisprudence, there are 
two different types of appeals. There is direct appeal, and there is a collateral ap-
peal. A direct appeal is an appeal of a criminal verdict made directly to the state or 
federal court of appeals or from the court of appeals to a higher court from the trial 
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court. Collateral appeal starts when a defendant files a habeas corpus petition. Be-
cause habeas corpus petitions are civil law cases, they use the rules of civil proce-
dure and appellate procedure.  
While the Supreme Court established that new rules of criminal procedure 
will not be generally applied retroactively to collateral review cases,216 the Court 
stated that there was the possibility of retroactivity if “those rules would be applied 
retroactively to all defendants on collateral review through one of the two excep-
tions we have articulated.”217  
First, retroactivity should apply if the new rule changes the fundamental na-
ture of what kinds of conduct may or may not be proscribed by the criminal sys-
tem.218 In other words, this exception is understood to apply to new rules dealing 
grounds relating to substantive due process.219 Substantive rules, are rules that “al-
ter[] the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.”220 For ex-
ample, in Street v. New York, the conduct in question was the act of saying words 
and was up as a matter of constitutional interpretation that put individuals constitu-
tionally protected conduct in question.221 
Second, retroactivity should apply if the new rule of constitutional criminal 
procedure implicates the fundamental fairness of a trial.222 In other words, “water-
shed rules of criminal procedure.”223 A rule falling under the second exception 
would need to be of a type that without it, the “likelihood of an accurate conviction 
is seriously diminished.”224 While not completely out of the realm of possibility, the 
Court stated, “Because we operate from the premise that such procedures would be 
so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt, we believe it unlikely 
that many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge.”225 The Court 
indicated that such an exception would rarely be met.226 
The analysis coming out of Teague, when determining whether to retroactive-
ly apply a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure, is a three-step test.227 First, 
the court must consider nature of the defendant’s conviction.228 That is, whether the 
conviction is final or not.229 Second, the court must consider the legal landscape at 
the time of the conviction.230 The court must consider the new rule, and whether the 
constitution and existing precedent would have compelled the new rule at the time 
of the conviction.231 In essence, the second question asks the court to determine if 
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the rule is actually new, or just a different interpretation of already existing law.232 
If the court determines that the new law is, in fact, new, then the final step asks the 
court to determine whether the new law fits under either of the two exceptions that 
would allow the rule to have retroactive effect.233 
B. What Constitutes a New Rule? 
One of the primary components, if not the primary component, of a retroac-
tivity analysis, is the determination that a Court decision announces a new rule.234 
Looking back at the difference between direct review and collateral review, court 
decisions that do not announce a new rule are generally applicable in all cases on 
direct review because, in those cases, judicial finality is not threatened; however, 
for cases on collateral review, absent the announcement of a new rule, falling into 
the accompanying exceptions, the general rule coming out of Teague establishes 
that judicial decisions are not available as a basis for collateral relief. Thus for peti-
tioners on collateral review, it is vital to establish what constitutes a new rule, and 
when the Court announces a new rule. 
In Teague, the Court explained that there are two circumstances in which the 
Court will have announced a new rule.235 First, a Court holding that breaks new 
legal ground will constitute the announcement of a new rule.236 Second, a Court 
holding that “imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” 
will constitute the announcement of a new rule.237 Or rather, “a case announces a 
new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defend-
ant’s conviction became final.”238 But again, the Court went on to state that 
“[u]nless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules 
of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final 
before the new rules are announced.”239  
In Graham v. Collins, the Court explained that if the new rule of constitution-
al criminal procedure expressly overrules a prior decision, the Court may easily 
hold that it constitutes a new rule.240 However, determining whether an extension of 
the reasoning found in precedent cases constitutes a new rule is more difficult.241 
The purpose of federal habeas review is to ensure that criminal proceedings are 
conducted in accordance with timely interpretation of the constitution.242 As such, a 
good faith interpretation of existing precedent at the time of the conviction will not 
be held as contrary to later decisions sufficient to announce a new rule.243 In so rea-
soning, the Court drew distinctions on the time frame for when the Court should 
apply a constitutional analysis for determining if a new rule was announced. The 
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timely interpretation of the constitution was not meant as a present interpretation, 
but rather an interpretation at the time of the precedent’s decision.  
The Court in Graham provided that it was the precedent Court that was given 
a good faith interpretation on the constitution and that the present Court should 
place the focus, not on a constitutional interpretation of the rule under circumstanc-
es present at the time of the current conviction, but rather how the constitution was 
interpreted at the time of the precedent Court’s decision. Thus, announcing a new 
rule based simply on the overruling of a precedent decision was no longer a 
straightforward affair but consisted of looking at the precedent Court’s decision and 
applying a good faith standard to its constitutional interpretation at the time of the 
original decision. 
With such a standard that allows the Court to give precedent Courts the bene-
fit of a good faith constitutional interpretation, new rules are almost never an-
nounced.244 The language used in Teague is mirrored in Chaidez v. United States, 
where the Supreme Court explained Teague’s application of the new rule analysis 
stating that the Court announces a new rule “when it breaks new ground or imposes 
a new obligation on the government.”245 Or, “a case announces a new rule if the 
result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction 
became final.”246  
However, the Chaidez Court went further and explained that there is a flipside 
to the Teague holding.247 The Court noted that “Teague also made clear that a case 
does not announce a new rule, when it is merely an application of the principle that 
governed a prior decision to a different set of facts.”248 The Court was referring to 
situations where an established legal standard was being applied to a different set of 
facts. Specifically, the Chaidez Court noted the cases of Strickland v. Washington249 
and Padilla v. Kentucky.250 The legal standard at issue in Strickland was whether 
the assistance of counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.251 
While application of that standard to different factual circumstances may yield dif-
ferent or even contradictory outcomes, it does not rise to the level of establishing a 
new rule.252 The Chaidez Court noted that “we have granted relief under Strickland 
in diverse contexts without ever suggesting that doing so required a new rule.”253  
Comparing Strickland to Padilla, the Court explained that “Padilla would not 
have created a new rule had it only applied Strickland’s general standard to yet 
another factual situation . . . .”254 However, the Court went on to explain that Pa-
dilla added a question prior to the application of the standard found in Strickland.255 
The Padilla Court asked the question whether the Strickland standard should even 
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be applied under the circumstances.256 While the simple application of the standard 
from Strickland did not rise to the level of a new rule, the Chaidez Court held that 
adding that prior question was sufficient to hold that Padilla did announce a new 
rule.257  
Distinguishing between the two cases, the Court went on to explain that “the 
beginning point of [the Court’s] analysis is a rule of general application, a rule de-
signed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts.”258 Addi-
tionally, the Court noted that “it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so 
novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent.”259 In other words, 
“when all we do is apply a general standard to the kind of factual circumstances it 
was meant to address, we will rarely state a new rule for Teague purposes.”260 
V. APPLICATION OF TEAGUE’S RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS TO EVANS 
Teague’s three-step retroactivity analysis provides the framework for decid-
ing if a Supreme Court decision has retroactive application. This part first considers 
whether the Court in Evans announced a new rule and, if so, whether either of the 
two exceptions to the general rule against the retroactive application of new rules to 
petitioners on collateral review would apply, then considers what effect, in any, the 
Evans ruling has for habeas corpus claims in Idaho. 
A. Does Evans Announce a New Rule? 
The question then, is did Evans announce a new rule that would have retroac-
tive applicability to criminal defendant petitioners in Idaho who wish to bring a 
habeas corpus action due to the abrogation of Korsen? Remember, the Court in 
Teague explained that there are two circumstances in which the Supreme Court will 
have announced a new rule.261 First, a Court holding that breaks new legal ground 
will constitute the announcement of a new rule.262 Second, a Court holding that 
“imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” will constitute 
the announcement of a new rule.263 Or rather, “a case announces a new rule if the 
result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction 
became final.”264 
The Court in Evans was quick to find existing precedent more than sufficient 
to show the application of a general standard.265 The Court explained the applica-
tion of precedent within its holding.266 And, speaking to the matter of precedent, the 
Court stated that “we do not write on a clean slate. Quite the opposite. It has been 
half a century since we first recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial 
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following a court-decreed acquittal, even if the acquittal is based upon an egre-
giously erroneous foundation.”267 The Court explained that “mistaken acquittal is 
an acquittal nonetheless.”268 The Court based its legal conclusion on the difference 
between two types of rulings.269 The general standard the Court applied hinged on 
whether the lower court’s acquittal was based on substantive or procedural rul-
ings.270 The Court reasoned that even though erroneous procedural rulings may 
terminate a trial, the risks associated with procedural rulings are not as severe as the 
risks associated with substantive rulings.271 The Court considers the judicial interest 
in finality to be much stronger in cases of court determinations based on substan-
tive rulings because it more adequately protects the defendant. 272  
However, erroneous procedural rulings do not trigger the same judicial pro-
tection for defendants because they are not sufficiently based on the factual deter-
mination of guilt or innocence.273 The Court’s main focus in defining this differen-
tiation was to maintain the defendant’s expectation of finality.274 As such, the Court 
held that substantive judicial rulings, but not procedural rulings, that end in a court-
decreed acquittal, trigger double jeopardy protection for criminal defendants re-
gardless of any erroneous foundation.275 Based on the majority’s reasoning for its 
decision in Evans, and Teague’s holding that “a case announces a new rule if the 
result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction 
became final,”276 Evans did not announce a new rule. 
However, while the majority opinion in Evans held that an acquittal based on 
a substantive ruling cannot be reviewed, “on error or otherwise, without putting a 
defendant twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution,”277 the dissent-
ing opinion raised some concerns.278 The primary objection to the majority’s posi-
tion is that it breaks from the original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause by 
switching the focus from the elements of the offense, to a categorical determination 
of substantive verses procedural rulings.279 As the dissent notes, the text of the Fifth 
Amendment reads that no “person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb.”280 A plain reading of the text shows that the “of-
fence” is the pivotal part of the amendment.281 A criminal charge is defined by that 
elements that comprise the charge.282  
The dissent noted that by moving away from the specific elements of the 
charge, the majority held contrary to established precedent that had consistently 
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held that an acquittal must represent a resolution of “some or all of the factual ele-
ments of the offense charged.”283 Holding that an acquittal was valid based on a 
determination that a substantive, rather than procedural, ruling was issued, regard-
less of any connection to the actual elements of the offense charged, changed the 
nature of the Court’s view on the protections granted by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.284  
Under the dissent’s characterization of what the majority held, Evans looks 
like a fundamental change in the nature of how the Double Jeopardy Clause is in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court, and a decision that was “not dictated by precedent 
existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”285 As such, the dis-
sent’s understanding of what the majority held may be interpreted to characterize 
the decision in Evans as announcing a new rule that may provide relief to criminal 
defendants on collateral appeal if the new rule were to fall into one of the two ex-
ceptions. 
B. The Effect of Evans on Habeas Corpus Claims in Idaho 
With the Court in Evans holding for double jeopardy protection in cases deal-
ing with erroneous judicial determinations, and with the abrogation of the Idaho 
Supreme Court case of Korsen, the question arises of what, if any, effect the 
Court’s holding in Evans will have on habeas corpus claims for collateral relief in 
Idaho. That question is answered through an application of the three-step test for 
retroactivity discussed in Teague. 
Based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Evans, the abrogation of Korsen 
will not have any effect on habeas corpus claims for collateral relief in Idaho. Start-
ing with the three-step analysis established by the Court in Teague, first, the court 
must consider the nature of the defendant’s conviction.286 That is, whether the con-
viction is final or not.287 This is a case specific question that the Court will consider 
at the time. This first inquiry is almost a threshold question based on the holding in 
Teague that “new rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively to cases 
which had become final on direct review at the time the new rule was decided.”288 
If the petitioner’s conviction is not yet final, then if a new rule of constitutional 
criminal procedure was announced, it would be applied to any petitioner currently 
on direct review.289  
Second, the Court must consider the legal landscape at the time of the convic-
tion and whether the constitution and existing precedent would have compelled the 
new rule at the time of the conviction.290 In Evans, the Court clearly expressed that 
its decision was based on established precedent that sufficiently showed the general 
standard for analysis of a claim under double jeopardy protection.291 The Court 
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expressed that its decision was based on the presence of a long standing recognition 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects criminal defendants from a retrial after a 
court-decreed acquittal even if that acquittal was based on an erroneous legal foun-
dation. 292  
While a defendant may argue that the abrogation of the ruling in Korsen was 
a rule of constitutional criminal procedure that expressly overruled a prior decision 
and, therefore, the Court should hold that it constitutes a new rule,293 as previously 
noted, determining whether an extension of the reasoning found in precedent cases 
constitutes a new rule is not an easy task.294 In any future claim for collateral relief 
based on the decision in Evans, the Court would apply the good faith interpretation 
of existing precedent found in Graham.295 Based on the clear statements of the ma-
jority opinion in Evans, the Court might easily hold that at the time of the Evans 
decision, the Court’s ruling was based on an adequate interpretation of the constitu-
tional landscape at the time.296Therefore, Evans did not announce a new rule, and 
the three-step Teague analysis would end there.  
However, some weight may be given to the arguments given in the Evans dis-
sent. The precedent cases and the analysis of the Court’s decision to base its ruling 
of the condition of substantive rulings versus procedural rulings rather than an 
analysis of the elements of the criminal charged, as found through the use of the 
word offence in the Fifth Amendment, is strong support for the argument that the 
Court in Evans did, in fact, announce a new rule. A rule that changed how the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause would be analyzed for triggering constitutional protections for 
criminal defendants in situations where a court-decreed acquittal was based on an 
erroneous determination of one of the essential elements of the charged offense. As 
such, an analysis of the third Teague step is informative. If the Court determined 
that the holding in Evans did announce a new rule, then the Court would continue 
on to the final step in the Teague analysis.297 
Finally, the Court will determine if either of the exceptions to the general rule 
against the retroactivity of new rules announced by the Supreme Court are applica-
ble. First, a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure will be given retroactive 
effect if it changes the fundamental nature of what kinds of conduct may or may 
not be proscribed by the criminal system.298 What that means, is that if a new rule 
relates to substantive due process, 299 or rather, alters “the range of conduct or the 
class of persons that the law punishes,” then it will be given retroactive effect.300  
It would strain any possible interpretation of the ruling in Evans to find satis-
faction of this first exception to the rule against retroactivity. The circumstances 
dealing with the protections granted by the Double Jeopardy Clause fall outside the 
range of substantive due process and bear no relation on prohibited or proscribed 
conduct of the defendants, and further, bears no relationship to any specific class of 
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defendant. Even if the Court found that Evans announced a new rule, that new rule 
would not fall within the first exception. 
Second, retroactivity should apply if the new rule of constitutional criminal 
procedure implicates the fundamental fairness of a trial.301 The Court has catego-
rized this exception to mean “watershed rules of criminal procedure.”302 Or rather, 
this second exception deals with rules so fundamental to the judicial process that 
without them, the “likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”303 
The Court has stated that it considers such basic rules, that are fundamental to the 
judicial process, to be “so central to an accurate determination of innocence or 
guilt, we believe it unlikely that many such components of basic due process have 
yet to emerge.”304 It is only in the rarest circumstances that such an exception 
would be met.305 While the decision in Evans may influence the accuracy of con-
victions dealing with erroneous substantive rulings, it would again strain a reasona-
ble interpretation to find that it impact the basic, fundamental, likelihood for an 
accurate determination of innocence or guilt that is required under the second ex-
ception. 
And so, while an alternate interpretation of the ruling in Evans would suggest 
that it did, in fact, announce a new rule, under an application of the Teague analysis 
for retroactivity—even if the Court found that Evans announced a new rule—such 
a judicial determination would fall outside of the two exceptions to the general rule 
against the retroactivity of Supreme Court decisions. Thus, Evans, despite its abro-
gation of Korsen, would have no effect on habeas corpus claims for collateral relief 
in Idaho. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the Supreme Court case of Evans v. Michigan, the Court held that the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause barred the retrial of a criminal defendant after a court-directed 
acquittal. Retrial was barred even in the event that the acquittal rested on the trial 
court’s erroneous understanding of the law. Based on the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Evans, it is safe to say that the abrogation of Korsen will not have any effect on 
habeas corpus claims for collateral relief in Idaho. The likely interpretation of the 
ruling in Evans was that the Court did not announce a new rule, and even if it did, 
that new rule announced does not fall within the two exceptions that would allow 
retroactive application to petitioners in habeas corpus claims for collateral relief.  
The Supreme Court in Evans did not announce a new rule. The two estab-
lished circumstances that the Supreme Court has stated announce a new rule are not 
applicable to Evans. The Court discussed a number of established precedent cases 
dealing with acquittals and the majority opinion clearly sets forth the precedent 
from which it drew its decision and the general standard from which its ruling 
stems; that being the distinction between an erroneous court-decreed acquittal 
based on a substantive ruling versus one based on a procedural ruling. The Su-
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preme Court explained that it was not the application of a new rule but rather a clar-
ification of existing precedent to a new set of circumstances. As such, the holding 
in Evans did not break new legal ground. 
Further, even an interpretation of Evans that establishes a new rule of consti-
tutional criminal procedure would offer no benefit to petitioners on collateral ap-
peal. While the shift from a focus on the essential elements of a criminal offence to 
a categorical determination of the ruling based on its substantive or procedural na-
ture might constitute a new rule and trigger a Teague retroactivity analysis, such a 
new rule still fails to satisfy either of the two exceptions to the general rule against 
the retroactive application of new rules for petitioners on collateral appeal.  
Such a new rule does not change the fundamental nature of what kinds of 
conduct may or may not be proscribed by the criminal system or alter the class of 
person that the law encompasses. The Double Jeopardy Clause and its protections 
are awarded to all classes of persons, and the protection against the retrial of crimi-
nal defendants is, at its core, procedural. Additionally, such a new rule does not 
seriously increase the likelihood of an accurate conviction. Only new rules that the 
Court considers fundamental to the judicial process on a level that is central in de-
termining the innocence or guilt of a criminal defendant will be given retroactive 
application. A presumed new rule coming out of Evans fails to meet such a defini-
tion. 
Looking at the entirety of the Teague analysis, the Court’s decision in Evans 
fails to meet the established conditions for announcing a new rule. An interpreta-
tion of the Evans holding, as set forth by Justice Alito in the dissent, does cast the 
majority’s decision in a light favoring establishment of a new rule. However, even 
if that were true, the new rule established in Evans fails to fall within the two ex-
ceptions to the general rule against retroactive application of new rules of criminal 
procedure that was established in Teague.  
Based on the holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause offers protection to 
criminal defendants from retrials after a court-directed acquittal, and a determina-
tion that retrial is barred even when the acquittal is founded on the trial court’s er-
roneous understanding of the law, the Supreme Court case of Evans v. Michigan 
will not act as a source for a claim by criminal defendant petitioners upon which 
they may seek collateral relief. Therefore, the Supreme Court case of Evans v. 
Michigan, and its abrogation of State v. Korsen, will have no effect on the state of 
habeas corpus claims for collateral relief in Idaho. 
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